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IntroductionI tr ti
Traditional (single receiver) system setup:
● Choose exploit field (e.g. last byte of TCP Timestamp)
● Alice: probabilistically inject parts of coded message into field
● Bob: extract symbols from field, decode to correct errors
● Warden: assume full knowledge of system and keys
Can we create undetectable system?
Previous detection work:
● Signatures – published exploits thwart easily
● Anomaly – qualitative arguments until statistical methods in [1]
● Brute-Force – never mentioned in literature, significant oversight
Contributionstri ti
Thwarting Anomaly Detection:
● Propose better quantification technique
● Provide fast approximation
Thwarting Brute-Force Detection:
● Propose multiple colluding receiver design
● Verify possibility of brute-force in single receiver system
● Show our design's resilience to threat
Brute-Force Detection:
● Single receiver, for each stream in network decode exploit field
● Multiple receivers, decode all combinations of r streams
Multiple Receiver Designlti l  i r i
Multiple receiver system setup:
● Split coded message, inject parts to each receiver
● Decoding depends on all receivers
● Receivers extract symbols, share them to decode
Detection Quantificationt ti  tifi ti
Goal: Conservative estimate for probability of detection
● S ← sequence of symbols from exploit field w/o injection
● Injection process = f: S → S'
● For symbol s use diff. between S and S' to calc. probability
●UCL(s) - comes straight from statistical quality control [2]
●ρ - calculates the rate of occurrence of s in sequence
Approximation Method:
● Calculating binomial coefficient is slow if |S'| is large
● Use Sterling's Approximation for factorial [3]
ImplementationI l t ti
CovertSSH, a trojaned version of OpenSSH-5.3p1
● SSH uses Binary Packet Protocol (BPP) for transportation
● Use last byte of BPP's random padding field for exploit
Using Emulab [4] we experiment with our system
● Inject headlines from USA Today newspaper
Future Workt r  r
●Steganography, anonymity, watermarking
●Deniability
Use estimate for single symbol, quantify detection
● Let U be the alphabet of covert message
● Quantify detection of each s in U  then combine
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